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On Sovereignty and Overhumanity 
Why It Matters How We Read Nietzsche's 
Genealogy 11:2* 
Christa Davis Acampora 
There is nearly unanimous agreement, among those who bother to pay atremion to 
Nietzsche's anomalous claim about the "sovereign individual" in the second essay 
of On the Genealogy of Morals that the "sovereign" is Nietzsche's ideaJ, and many 
more still rake sovereignty as the signature feature of the overman Niensche heralds 
in his Thus Spoke Zarathustra and other writings. 1 describe the reception among 
Nietzsche scholars as "nearly unanimous" because there has been at least one cry of 
dissem: that issued by Lawrence Harab. 1 Curiously, his brief but incisive commems 
about the problematic nature of several readings along these lines continue to be 
ignored. With this chapter, I add my voice to his and call for a rally. Emphases on 
Nierzsche's sovereign individuality encourage whar J shall argue is a misreading of 
dte passage in quesrlon. Moreover, this mistake has far-reaching consequences inso-
far as it supports a mischaracteriz.adon of Niensche's philosophy generally and 
results in a f.tilure to consider significant ways in which Nietzsche's conception of 
the subject might be relevanr for comemporary moral philosophy. 
Nietzsche most certainly is not upholding what he calls "the sovereign individual" 
as an ideal for which we should strive, and there is plenty of evidence to support the 
assertion. Few mauers in Nietzsche interpretation are dearly and decisively seeded, 
bur I imend ro add this one to that meager stock. In what follows, I scrutinize the 
context of Lhe passage in quescion and its resonance with the overarching theme of 
*Revised by the author from its original publicacion in International Studies in Phi/mopby 36:3 
(F.JI2004)o 127-45. 
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the work in which it. -appears (my section I). I then consider what would be necessary 
co fi.mher support the majoriry view and show why such pro jeers are umenable (sec-
cion 11). Finally, I briefly discuss why I think ir maners very much that we get rhis 
one right (section Ill). ~he "sovereign individual" has animated numerous discus-
sions of Nietzsche's politics and ethics. How we read GMII:2 strikes at rhe heart of 
what we take co be the most significam feamres of Nier-L.Sche's constructive philo-
sophical projects. 
I. "THE SOVEREIGN INDMDUAL": WHAT IT IS 
The passage in question is familiar: 
If we place oursdves at the end of rhis tremendous process, where the tree at last brings 
fonh fruit, where society and the moraliry of custom at last reveal what they have simply 
been dte means to: tlu:n we discover that rhe ripest fruit is the sovn?ign individual, like 
only to himsdf, liberated again from mol"'ality of custom, autonomous and supramoral 
(for 'autonomous' and 'moral' are mutuaJiy exclusive), in shorr, the man who has his 
own independent, protracted will and the right to make promises-and in him a proud 
consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at length been achieved and 
become Resh in him, a consciousness of his own power and freedom, a sensation of 
mankind come to completion.2 
A good place to begin is to consider what is the nature of"this nemendous process" 
so char we can bcner appreciate how it is that the sovereign individual is its ftuit. 
The second essay of the Genealogy explicitly nears che development of concepts asso-
cia[l:~d wirh moral responsibility and culpability. There, Nietzsche considers r:he fun-
dantental basis of" 'guile,' 'rhe bad conscience,' and the like," beginning with 
promise-making. Nietzsche is essentially asking: What sore of being, what sort of 
animal, musr one become in order co be able co make promises?3 
On our way coward considering how Niensche addresses this question, which 
orients rhe rest of the essay, we mighr narc a consideration co which we will return 
in the next section: Kaufmann and Hollingdale's translation of rhe very first sentence 
of the second essay has led many astray. h is often cited precisely as it appears in 
their English rranslacion: "To breed an animal with the right to make promises-is 
nor this rhe paradoxical task rhar nature has set itself in rhe case of man? is it not 
the real problem regarding n1an?" ["Ein Thier heranzOchren, das versprechen darf-
isr das nicht gcrade jene paradoxe Aufgabe selbst, welche sich die Name in Hinsicht 
auf den Menschen gestdlr hat? isr cs nicht das eigentliche Problem vom Mcnschen?" 
(KSA 5, 291)] Rendering "das versprechen darf" as "with the right co make prom-
ises" has encouraged those who rely on the transladon co think that Nierzsche sees 
promise-making as an entitlement that one must earn or which one is granted, and 
which presumably stands in contrast wtrh somerhing co which one might be inher-
ently obliged. As I ~hall discuss at grearer lengrh below, it has been associated with 
On Sovneignty and Overhumanity 149 
a cerrain kind of freedom. Moreover, since Nietv;;che seems co emphasize orders of 
rank and entidemem throughom his writings, some compound their first error with 
a second in suggesting that it is Nietzsche's position char rhis son of' cntidcment is 
something char might actually be desirable, that our seizure of ir would repre.<>ent 
some son of completion of ourselves, the full realization of humanity. The more 
literal translation "who is permined ro promise" or "who is capable of promising" 
dearly better captures the sense of Nierzschc's phrase, since che very next senrence 
contrasts promising wirh irs coumeracdng Kraft-the power or force of forgerring. 4 
Thus read, we better appreciate Nietzsche's suggestion that promising relies upon 
some kind of power (we soon learn thar ir is remembering) that has been Cultivated 
to the point rhat it ourscrips forgetting. Promising depends upon a Kraft-it is not 
an encidemem or right-and irs enhancement emerged rhrough a developmemal 
process in which a counteracdng Kraft was diminished. 
The second account of the genealogy of morality rhar consrirmes GM II charts rhe 
struggle of rhe rwo opposing forces of remembering and forgening.. rhercby casting 
morality in terms similar to how Nietv;;che describes tragic arr as resring upon rhe 
contesr of the artistic forces of creadon and destruction in The Birth of Tragedy. The 
rask of GM II is co offer an account of how rhe Kraft of remembering accomplished 
irs vicrory, and ro chart the deleterious effects of rbe ::~.trophy of forgetting in rhe 
course of human dcvdopmem. The message is: the acquisition of the kind of willing 
that is had in promise-making came with a price-the diminution of forgetting, and 
we allow it to wither only at our peril. This interpretation is reinforced in Nietz-
sche's insistence that forgetting is nor merely an absence or failure of remembering, 
but is rather somerhing that is positive~)' active in its own right. Nietzsche couches the 
maccer in org.mic, biological terms of nutrition and digestion: "it lforgetring] is .. 
responsible for rhe facr rhat what we experience and absorb enters our consciousness 
as lirrle while we arc digesting it (one might call the process 'inpsychation ')-as does 
rhc thousandfold process, involved in physical n~urishmenr-so-<alled 'incorpora-
tion"' (GMII:l). Were it not fiu forgetting, iris suggested here, we would nor have 
a soul, a psyche, much as we would nor have a body, a corpus, were we nor able to 
eat. The ~hemes of forgetting as an active force and Nierzsche's use of metaphors for 
digestion have nor gone unnoticed. Bm what seems to have been overlooked is whar 
rhis has to do with what Nierzsche says in the very next seccion of essay two in which 
the reference to the sovereign individual occurs. How is the sovereign individual the 
product of a process in which rhe acrive forces of remembering and forgeuing strug-
gle, with the result that remembering surmounts and suppresses its opponent? More 
precisely, what in the course of this struggle does rhe sovereign individual trump? 
Answering the latter quesrion leads us back to a deeper invesrigarion of forgetting. 
Briefly, we can recall char rhe good of forgerring, as Nietzsche writes in GM II: I, 
issues from its effects of inplychating consciousness; another way of putting it is that 
forgetting plays a role in the regulatory process that permits us to appropriate our 
experience such rhat we rake from ir whar is necessary and rid ourselves of what is 
not.5 Nietzsche does not think that an individual is simply 0:1. monadic unitary emiry. 
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Instead, we are composed of a multiplicity of forces such that "our organism is oli-
garchically arranged." Nier-LSche's claim about the organization of the kind of organ-
ism we arc warranrs underscoring here, because ir is both consistent with what 
Nier-tschc does write aboU£ rhe "ficdon" of the concept of individuals (e.g., BGE 
16-20 and GM 1:13), and inconsistent with (what he doesn'twrite about) an individ-
ual who actually is sovereign and self-legislacing. We shall have occasion co address 
Lhis issue in greater derail in rhc second section ef this chapter. 
Returning co the maner wirh which Nietz.sche's second essay begins, we can now 
rcformulare its inaugural question rhus: What must have happened-from an 
organic devdopmenral srandpoim-in order for us ro be able (for nature to have 
granted w; the ability) ro make promises? Clearly, this is a quescion that is raised 
ahout humankind generally. It applies to the kind of being that makes us human 
beings. It is nor asked about individual humans. Indeed, t:ach of the essays of the 
Genealogy endeavor, from a variety of perspecdves, to offer a creation story of how 
rhc human animal, generally, came lO be what it is, cmwined with an etiology of 
moral concepts. The second essay is abom the developmenc of humankind as the 
animal with a conscience. What characterizes our species, at least as it is cast in chis 
second essay, is the Etcr that some forces were strengthened over ochers in the course 
of our development. This process was completed (hence, it is not some tantalizing 
possibility for furure philosophers ro achieve) in pursuit of a particular "conscious-
ness of ... power and freedom," a "sensation" stemming from having and exercising 
the kind of power realized in promise-making. Hooked on that feelihg, so to speak, 
human beings have (perversely) embraced their characteristic deformity (i.e., the 
atrophy of forgccring that occurs through the hyper-development of remembering). 
Indeed, rhe aesrhcsis of power that courses rhroughout the entire economy of 
prmnise-m2king-making promises, breaking them, and punishing others who are 
unable or unwilling to keep promises-is so great that humans have even instigated 
their own further deformily (i.e., more sophisticated mnemonics and the extirpation 
of ~Orgetfulncss). 
Nietzsche's preoccupation wirh this process in On the Genealogy of Morals and 
elsewhere is tied ro his concern for figuring out wherher autonomy really is the telos 
of humanity thar modern philosophy and the emerging social sciences claim it ro 
be. What development might rake us beyond ourselves, Nietzsche asks, and what 
would we be like if we overcame humanity as such? Would such overhumanity entail 
soverdgn individualily? I believe Nietzsche thinks not, at least not as it is described 
in GMII:2. 
II. "THE SOVEREIGN INDMDUAL": 
WHAT IT IS NOT 
In the course of sorting through this particular issue it is necessary to consider how 
the idea of the sovetf;:ign individual has been pressed into service in variOus imerpre-
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rations in rhe scholarly literature, to consider what general image of Nietzsche thC>se 
interpretations support, and to see whether such readings become difficult to susrain 
once the support lent by the concept of rhe soverdgn individual is withdrawn. It is 
quite difficult to select which readings of GM 11:2 should serve as the basis of this 
discussion. Once I commiued mysdf co this topic, I was surprised to discover just 
how rampant the problc::m is, and how frequently the "sovereign individual" creeps 
into all manner of discussions of Nietzsche's works.6 Those who point to the sover-
eign individual as Nicrzsche's ideal gener.ally associate it with "the higher men," and 
sovereign individuality is often discussed in the context of clarifying what it means 
tn "become what one is." In this section, I shall recount Hatab's points against the 
prevailing readings of rhe sovereign individual, supplement his claims, and critique 
several recent exemplary discussions that affirm the sovereign as Nietzsche's ideal. 
In his A Nietzschean Deftnse of Democracy, Hatab asserts rhat the "sovc::reign indi-
vidual" names "the modernist ideal of subjective auwnomy,'' and that "Nietzsche 
displaces" racher than embraces such ideals. 7 This becomes clear when one notices, 
as virtually no one else does, char Nicrzsche thinks that modern conceptions of the 
individual as autonomous have been crafted in order ro press them into the setvice 
of moral accountability and retribution: "'Auronomy,'" Harab writes, "is some-
thing that Nietzsche uaces to rhe inversion of master morality; freedom in rhis sense 
means 'responsible,' 'accountable,' and therefore 'reformable'-all in the sctvicc of 
convincing the strong to 'choose' a different kind of behavior (GM I:l3)."H Thus, 
the distinguishing characteristic of the sovereign individual as it is described in GM 
II:2-namely, that it auronomous-is precisely what Nietzsche identifies as the leg-
acy of moralization, which has produced the decadence that he associates with 
humanity in its modern formY I have addressed abC>ve how Nietzsche advances a 
quasi-physiological hypolhesis aboul this process iu terms of the deve!C>pment of 
powers of forgetting and remembering, and l shall ierurn to chis maner below. 
Related tn the issue of autonomy is Nietzsche's conception of freedom, which 
ambiguous as it may be, Harab advises, is neverrhelc::ss dearly in tension with the 
kind of freedom associated with the sovereign individual who would he "ma.s:ter of 
ftee will." Hatab asks his readers to recall BGE 21 in which Nietzsche rejects idea of 
the completely free will: "the desire ro bear rhe entire and ulrimare responsibility for 
one's actions oneself, and ro absolve God, rhe world, ancescors, chance, and society 
involves nothing less than to be precisely [a} causa sui," which Nietzsche describes 
as "the best self-comradiction that has been conceived so far, it is a son of rape and 
perversion of logic." But Niensche's rejection of free will dC>es not signal his suppo-
sition- of a completely unftee will instead: "Suppose someone were thus to see 
through the boorish simpliciry of this celebrated concept of'free will' and pur it our 
of his head alwgerher, I beg of him w carry his 'enlighrenment' a step further, and 
also put out of his head the conrrary of this monstrous conception of 'free will': f. 
mean 'unfree will,' which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect." Nietzsche 
advances ideas about the concept of causality in numerous works. In the passage 
under consideration from BGE. Nietzsche advises ho!ding "cause" and "effect" as 
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"pure concepts," fictions that are useful for communication bur which do not have 
expUmatory powcr. 10 
Finally, Hatah notes that, "the sovereign individual is described as claiming power 
over fare, which does not square wirh one of Nietzsche's cencral recommendations 
amor foti (EH II, I O)."n Abouc the so-called sovereign individual, Nietzsche writes' 
"The pro~d awareness of the cxrraordinary privilege of resporlSibility, rhe conscious~ 
ness of rh1s rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fare, has in his case pene-
rnued to the profoundest depths and become inscinct, the dominacing instinct. 
What will he call this dominating instinct, supposing he feds the need ro give it a 
n:une? The answer is beyond doubt: chis sovereign man calls it his comcience" (GM 
11:2). Committing ont:self to conquering fate, which the sovereign individual of GM 
11:2 does as pan of raking responsibility for the promises he makes, would seem co 
stand in rhe way of, would specifica11y bind one to an idea char would prevent one 
~rom, l_oving one's ~are. Replacing the ideal char prevents one from loving one's fate 
IS prcc1scly what N1etzsche envisions at the end of GM II, and Zarathustra is sup~ 
posc_d EO make such _overcoming possible. 12 As I shall discuss below, iris overcoming 
the Jdcal of humamty as ulrimarely and fundarnemally sovereign in rhe sense pro-
vided in GM II:2 rhar "overhumaniry" is supposed to represem. 
But, d1c fact that rhe ''sovereign individual," as described in GM 11:2, is at odds 
wirh how Nietzsche rhinks about the composite nature of rhe self, his critique of the 
concept of free will, and his emphasis on amor foti, does not hinder those keen on 
l~lcaci.ng sovereign individuality at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy. A represenra-
nve VIew of the sover~ign as Nietzsche's ideal is advanced in David Owen's "Equalicy, 
Democracy, and Selt-Respecr: ReAections on Nietzsche's Agonal Perfectionism "13 
and Richard White devotes an enrire book ro the concept of sovereignty in Ni;tz-
sche's philosophy, Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty, 1" bmh of which I con~ 
s.ider here. Withour doubr, others could be added, and the meager review of the 
lueraru~e char l am able _co elaborate here by no means represents every approach to 
the ruptc. 15 Alrhough I do think I engage some of the most significant and promi-
nent themes, the literature would repay yet more specific consideration. There are 
two general poims I wish co make about the use of rhe sovereign individual in vari~ 
ous interpn:tations: (I) there is little in the way of suppon for the majority view that 
the sovereign individual is one of rhe core ideas of Nietzsche's positive project given 
that reference co such a being is limited ro rhe one seC{ion under discussion here; and 
(2) any interpretation that places sovereign individuality at the hean of Nietzsche's 
philosophy requires cmnmirring him w affirming other ideas, particularly about the 
nature of human subjecrivity, which he clearly finds problematic. 
The first poinr is very easily addressed. There is no mention of sovereignty per se 
in Z, preoccupations with the Obermemch withstanding. One finds nor a peep about 
the souveraine Individuum in BGE (where one might expect to encounter it in its 
political comcxt, especially if such individuals are supposed ro have earned special 
rights) or the works that follow the GM. There are just a smanering of references to 
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things "souverain" in the nmebooks between 1882 and 1889, and these· scant refer-
ences support the reading of rhac I have offered in the first section of rhis chaprer. 
Simply pur. there is not enough textual evidence to support rhe general and oft~ 
repeated claim that the sovereign individual of GM 11:2 is Nietzsche's ideal type. 
The more inreresdng issues emerge when we consider whar one must rake Nierz~ 
sche to be saying when one considers the sovereign individual ro be rhe ideal. A 
prominent feature of such discussions revolves around d1e maHer of "having rhe 
right to make promises." I take it that those who are wont co emphasize this phrase 
wish to draw a distinction between promising as an obligation that "the herd" 
imposes upon others in order to protecr itself, and those who have risen above sim~ 
ply meeting char imposed obligation and who are willing ro accept the responsibilicy 
to secure their word for themselves. 16 Put another way, rhe distinction drawn 
appears ro be: (1) relying upon the insritmion of promise~keeping (and che desire 
people have to avoid the harm that might come from the breaking of promises given 
to rhem) as the basis upon which a prhmise is made versus (2) agreeing ro serve as 
the guaramor of one's word for oneself. I can see how such an imerpretation can be 
rendered consistent with Nietzsche's preoccupation· with drawing distinctions 
becween the herd and those who somehow escape it, but how could it be that rhe 
Nietzsche who so emphasizes becoming, and who is suspicious of the concept of 
the subject (as rhe "doer behind rhe deed"), could think that is desirable-Icc alone 
possible--that a person could ensure his or her word in the future? How -could one 
promise to do something, to stand security fOr something, that cannot be predicted 
and for which one is, in a sense, no longer the one who could be responsible for ir? 
Either Nietzsche in GM 11:2 temporarily sets aside the concerns that preoccupy nor 
only his earlier thinking but also the very same book in which the passage in ques-
tion appears (cf. GM I: 13), or there is something wrong with anriburing such views 
EO Nietzsche. I am inclined to think rhe Iauer is rhe case, because rhis is not rhe only 
inconsistency at the heart of such interpretations. 
Nor only does Nietzsche think of the human subject, and all other entities for 
that matter, as having their being as a kind of becoming, bur there is plenty of evi-
dence that Nietzsche also thinks rhar our very conception of individuals is suspect, 
Nietzsche conceives of human beings, like all other organisms, as pluralirics; as com~ 
plcxcs of forces, not as discrete individual entities. This is nor ro say that there arc 
no individuals; the particularity of rhe relations among (or arrangemenr of) rhe 
forces we are accoums for our individualicyY The very interesting recent work on 
Nierzsche's knowledge of and conception of science bears Our chis mauer and traces 
rhe relevant literature. 1M Nierzsche chinks thar a well-functioning plurality, as nored 
above, is one that is governed as an oligarchy (and this stands in comrasr with the 
view of Plato's Socrares in the Republic, who characterizes the best soul as modeling 
an aristocracy}. 
It is at this poiOt that rhe earlier discussion of forgetting, which sets the theme of 
the second essay, becomes signific<l.llt again, because forgetting makes the oligarchic 
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arrangemenr possible. A pretense co sovereigmy is achieved with the substitution of 
monarchic aspiratio~1s ... ~ The process of strengthening the force of remembering for 
the p~rposes of a~h1evmg moral accoumability bears the fruit (i.e., yields rhe result 
u~on _Its complcn~n) of an enrity that undermines the very purposes for which its 
d1re~no_n was set: Ill the ~curse of producing a morally responsible agem, the hyper-
c~ln~au~n- of remcmbermg and the withering of forgetting yields a so-called sover-
eign mdJv1dual who, as sovereign, no longer recognizes the claims of moral law. 
Thus the process of moralization that produces such an individual overcomes or 
undermines its very end. Like Christianity, discussed in GM III, a morality that 
endeavors ro ground itself in radical auronomy is self-overcoming. The question rhat 
the Genealogy raises, without conclusively answering it, is-What comes next?-and 
w.e cannot begin ~o try to answer that question if we misread (or ignore) the begin-
nmg of GM II. G1ven that Christian moralicy and irs secular alternatives have turned 
our_ to ,undermine their very own foundacions) what, if anything, can serve as the 
bas1s for how we should culrivate ourselves and our relarions ro ochers? How can 
any action at all become meaningful or significant? 
To consider how the problem plays om in a specific imcrpreration, I wish to 
return to rhe troublesome issue of promising. If it is really such a crucial feature of 
the idea.! Nietzsche envisions: rhcn why is it that one finds nowhere else such great 
empl.l.asls pl~ced upon promise-making and promise-keeping? Those who wish w 
proffer this 1~ea must undertake some serious contortions in order to have it appear 
as though Nietzsche really does say as much himself. David Owe'n does this II . we. 
He rec~ncile_s Nien~che'~ sovereign-individual-as-promise-maker with the egoistic 
st_rands 111. Nietzsche s ph1losophy by claiming that the sovereign individual reaJizes 
Ius sovere1gmy first and foremost in rdarion ro himself. And that such is a condition 
for the possi~ility of mee~ing O[hers on rhese terms. Autonomous individuality is 
cast as rhc pmnacle of N!ct7.sch~'s aspirations, and Owen endeavors to ascribe to 
Niet~chc .~he v,i,ew r~at one ~as a ~uty (first to oneself, and then presumably ro 
others) to own ones humamry, wluch fundamentally lies in recognition of oneself 
as a sovereign individual. Thus, servility, or herd mentality, is a failure to undertake 
one's dudes. And failure co recognize sovereign individualirv in others Owen claim 
" d . [ l h ., ' ,, 
un crmm~ s r e grounds of my own recognition self-respect, chat is, that I am, 
qtul human being, a being who can stand to myself as a sovereign individual. "2o Per-
haps so, if those lupine beasts of prey from GM I can he donned in Kant's civil 
~he~pish _clot~~ing. B~r Owen's specification of the defining characteristic ofhuman-
•.ry •.s ~cllm~: I am, ~tua human being, a being who can stand to myself as a sovereign 
ttu!J_vldual (underhned emphasis mine). Nietzsche's discussion begins with consid-
eratJ~n ~f what the human animal is, the "breeding" or deveiOpmencal process 
reqUired m order m make it capable of promising (i.e., chiefly by hypenrophic devcl-
op~~nt of the power of memory and the withering of forgening). What Nietzsche 
anuCJpates as the future;; for humaniry in GM 111 and in Zis precisely rhe overcoming 
of_ the human such that even if we don'r become a differenr species altogether, we 
mtght at leasr devdop different capacides or different relations among,the order 
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forces that characterizes human existence generally. Nietzsche does not call us to 
realize the height of our humanity in becoming sovereign individuals (a capability 
already characteristic of the human animal, a "fruit" already borne)2 1 rather, he 
anticipates overcoming the concept of autonomy that buoys rhe contradictory ideal 
of rhc sovereign individual, and that requires the cultivation and heightening of dif-
ferent powers, which are nor alien to us bur which arc nonetheless latent. 
Owen docs the best job of finessing how the sovereign individual stands in rela-
tion to Nicrzsche's emphasis on becoming. It is worth considering his accounr ar 
some lengrh. The confines of this chapter do not afford rhc opporrunity ro give 
Owen's paper the full consideration it deserves, so I shall focus only on a passage 
chat constitutes Owen's most explicit definition of the sovereign individual, which 
as Owen describes it, is "not a telos" but rather a dramatization of 
an animde, a will to self-responsibiliry (in Emerson's language: self~reliance), which is 
manitesr in the perperual suiving ro increase, to expand, one's powers of seH:.governmem 
such that one can bear, incorporate and, even, love one's fate-one's exposure to chance 
and necessi1y. (In other words, the sovereign individual represents the attitude of amor 
fati, dmr is, the affirmation of the fact of our exposure to fortuna,) The noble soul 
reveres itself because it is engaged in overcoming icself. To srand to oneself as a sovtrtign 
individual is, rhus, ro stand to oneself as one who seeks to ex:rend oneself beyond one's 
current powers. In holding this view, Nietzsche is committed to a processual (i.e., non-
teleological) perfectionism. n 
If the sovereign individual can be conceived as realizing o; manifesting its sover-
eignty as an on-going process, then we can resolve a number of the issues that I have 
identified as problematic, most notably the concepcion of subjectivity and irs facul-
ties that seem ro be required for the kind of acciviry that is characteristic of the animal 
who has the capacity to make promises-namely, regularity, completeness, and 
identity. This reading wriggles our of conflict with Niensche's other more promi-
nent theme of hostiliry toward teleological thinking, suggests how it can be recon-
ciled with amor foti, and somehow ties it to self-overcoming and an extension of 
powers as a kind of self-enhancement. Bur notice what is not emphasized in chis part 
of Owen's interpretation, indeed what completely disappears, namely the idea of 
sovereignty as tied to pwmisi,ng. This is no accident. Rather than an exercise of 
self-legislating freedom, rhe autonomy of sovereign individuality instead becomes an 
attitude coward necessity and change. Promise-making completely recedes as it must, 
because what is required for promising-successfully distinguishing between chance 
and necessity, thinking causally, correctly predicting rhe future, being mindful of 
the future in the presem, even at the expense of the present, being able to decide 
with certainty about what it would be right to do and how ro go about doing it, 
being calculable, etc. ( CM II; I )--cannot be garnered while emphasizing the "proc-
essual" and perpetual striving that the sdf becomes when we are anentive to most 
of the rest of Nietzsche's philosophyY This leads me co wonder what good it does 
156 Christa Davis Acampora 
ro ric the model of self-reliance as "processual perfectionism" with rhe obscure refer-
ence to the souveraine Individuum in GM 11:2. Deriving a basis for democratic 
respect (and perhaps respecrability for Nietzsche among those with Kamian and lib-
eral philosophical inclinations) seems robe Owen's goal, bur I do nor think it would 
he Nietzsche's. Moreover, I am unsure that Nietzsche's work is the best place to 
look for rhe richest nor ion of what democratic respect might be, and I do nor rhink 
ir advisable to diswrr Nietzsche's texts in order w make it such. 
III. READING GM 11:2-WHY IT MATTERS 
At the root of the norian of rhe sovereign individual is the ideal of radical autonomy 
and, along with it, a kind of power over oneself and freedom or distance from oth-
ers. 14 Once ascribed to N iecz.sche, the idea seems to easily fit with the general reading 
of Nietzsche's critique of morality, which would presumably constrain radical 
auwnorny, and, more curiously, with his appeals to a new nobility (given the talk 
of special "rights" and entitlements that the sovereign individual has "earned"). 
Thus, even when the sovereign individual is nor called by name, its core idea 
stands-namely, that Nietzsche envisions rhe emergence of an ideal type whose sig-
namre characu:ristic is a form of autonomy so highly developed that ir can success-
fully exercise irs will tyrannically not only in matters political bur also in those 
epistcmic and axiological. But if, as I have argued above, the sovereign individual is 
nor Nicrzschc's ideal-on the grounds that both terms are problematic for Nietz-
sche-then the core idea of the power and freedom of auconomy, of which the "sov-
ereign individual" is supposedly emblematic, is similarly undermined. And with 
rlut, rhe interpretations that radiate from that fault line are also i:hrown in doubt. 
Thus, it matters very much how we read GM 11:2. 
By the dramatic conclusion of the secdon in question, the process of producing a 
conscience is summarized in its emirety. With that, Nietzsche suggests the process 
of our developrnem thar is comained in our currenr concept of human beings is 
completed. The quesdon remains whether this is truly the pinnacle of human exis-
tence. The sensarion of power we get from the mnemonics of resp01i.sibilicy leads us 
to believe it is, bur Nietzsche entertains the thought that there are some possibili-
ties-beyond cominuing relishing and relentlessly endeavoring to manifest saver~ 
cign individuality-that remain open to us. If we mistake the sovereign individual 
as Nietzsche's ideal for that which we ought (or might want) to strive, then we over-
look what Nicrzsche envisions beyond the overcoming of humanity anticipated in 
rhird and final essay of rhe Genealogy. 
MosL associate rhe sovereign individual with "higher humaniry,"25 claiming that 
they are rhe same or at least quite similar. Bur I have sought to make the case for 
rhe claim that Nietzsche sees rhe sovereign individual as standing at the end of a 
process of becoming the kind of animals that human beings are. In other words, the 
sovereign individual is the pinnacle of the current state of existence of humankind.26 
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If it is the case that Nietzsche envisions a kind of overcoming of humanity, some 
sort of development toward what we might call pverphumanity, and the sovereign 
individual stands at the end of rhe process that produced human animals, then over-
coming rhe sovereign individual is what Nietzsche envisions. If the sovereign individ-
ual continues to stand as our end, even if the d1aractcr of"rhe end" is construed so 
as to reconcile it with becoming, then we will fail both in understanding the task of 
pursuing that something higher that Nietzsche amici pates, and, consequently, in 
reaching it. 27 
Still, rhe ideal of sovereignty is certainly not alien to Nietzsche, and clearly the 
exercise of will that is cultivated in the strengthening of memory that promise-
making requires is compatible with Nieasche's emphasis on willing and its role in 
the creacion of meaning and significance. If rhe sovereignty of the sovereign individ-
ual named in GM 11:2 is nor precisely that for which Nietzsche is striving, then what 
is the other sense of sovereignty rhac Nietzsche can be said to affirm? How does ic 
differ from the sovereign of GM? In briet: I think much of this work has been done 
already by Richard White, whose imerpretation of what he describes as Nierzsche's 
problem of sovereignty deserves greater attemion and careful examination. White 
argues that Nietzsche presages rhe problem of sovereignty in which we find ourselves 
caught since modern, humanist conceptions of the subject have been undermined 
by the likes of philosophers as divcrsc,as Derrida and Dennett. Our contemporary 
philosophical labors seems to leave us with somerhing of a false dilemma regarding 
how we conceive the self: either the self is determined by narure and "sovereignty" 
is merely a product of history so that the sovereign individual is something rhat 
can be appreciated from an aesthetic point of view as the "creation" of necessity, or 
sovereign[)' is found in che freedom of necessity in which case "the sovereign individ-
ual represents rhe transfiguration and salvation of nature from irself.'' 2 ~ White pro-
poses a third alternative rhat casts Nicnschc as holding the view that sovereignty 
is something that is a "strategic possibility," something Nietzsche advances from a 
"perfonnative perspecrive" and rhar his writings aim to "provoke" in his readers. This 
allows White to take seriously Niet7$che's writings about eternal recurrence, fare, 
and necessity, while considering their tension with Nietzsche's appeals to creariviry, 
willing, and a new sense of freedom. White does this without much reference to the 
sovereign individual of GM 11:2,2~ and I think the direction of furrher study should 
follow White's lead. 
The misreading of GM 11:2 and its overemphasis on Nietzsche's interest in power 
potentially mischaracrcrizcs his explorations (and exhortations) of mastery. It encour-
ages associating Nietzsche's views wirh certain strands of existentialism that are actu-
ally quire at odds with many things Nietzsche has to say about fare, his interest in 
naturalism, and his complex views on freedom and nece11'Si[)'. Finally, such readings 
overlook and even obscure significam ways in which Nietzsche works through sev-
eral problems in conremporary philosophy, particularly regarding the issue of con-
ceiving the subject as contingenr and relarional while ar the same rime "natural," 
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and arriculadng the bases upon which we might model our relations co ocher sub-
jeers in light of contemporary critiques of rhe ideals of racionality and autonomy. 
The rettl problem of sovereignty draws us toward more deeply exploring how we 
might reconcile Nietzsche's appeals co creative willful activiry with his critiques of 
subjectivity and the key ideas about idemicy and causality chat arc crucia1 for rhe 
conception of sovereign ·individuality that serve as the basis of Kantian moral philos-
ophy and contemporary theories of justice and moral psychology. This is a problem 
for Nietzsche scholars, and its pursuit just might point toward promising furrher 
conrributions Nieo.sche's philosophy could make ro conremporary moral philoso-
phy. But if we: cominuc ro misread GM II:2, I think we will miss rhose oppnrtuni-
ric::s, and, borh within and outside rhe community of those who endeavor to practice 
reading well, Niernche will continue to be read as one obsessed with romantic exis-
tential fantasies about radical self-creation or self-transcendence and whose ideal 
type is nearly thoroughly unsuited for social life and unable to achieve rhe bonds of 
meaningful community. 
NOTES 
I. See his A Nietzschean Defome of Democracy: An Hxperiment in Postmodern Politics (Chi-
cago: Open Court, 1995), 37-38. 
2. Here, I eire Kaufmann and Hollingdalc's translation, which I amend below. KSA 5, 
293: "Srellcn wir uns dagegen an's Ende des ungeheuren Proze~ses, dorrhin, wo der Baum 
cndlich seine Frlichte zeitigt, wo die Societlit und ihre Sinlichkcit der Sitte endlich zu Tage 
bringr, wo1.11 sit: nur das Mittel war: so finden wir als reifste Feucht an ihrem Baum das souver-
aine Individuum, das nur sich selbst gleiche, das von der Sittlichkeit der Sine wieder losgek-
ommenc::, das auronome i.ibersittliche Individuum (denn 'autonom' und 'sittlich' schliesst sich 
aus), kurz den Menschen des eignen unabhangigen Iangen Willens, der vertprt!chen dar:r-nnd 
in ilun cin srolzes, in allen Muskeln zuckendes Bewus.stsein davon, was da endlich errungen 
und in ihm leibhaft geworden ist, ein eigenclkhes Macht- und Freiheits-Bewusstsein, ein Vol-
lcndung~·Geflihl des Menschcn Liberhaupt." 
3. Subsequem w the original publication of rhis chapter, PaulS. Loeb published an arti-
cle endorsing my view rhar Nietzsche's ideal is nor the "sovereign individual" but arguing for 
a different reading of Nietzsche's claims abour forgetting ("Finding rhe (/bermensch in Nietz-
sche's Genealogy of Morality," Journal ofNietztche Studies 30 tAurumn 2005]: 70-10 I; revised 
excerpt included in rhis volume). Loeb further develops what comes afrer the "overcoming of 
humanity." In this slightly revised version, I add a few minor clarifications in light of Loeb's 
comments. Rather than argue point by point, I simply note here that Loeb and I apparently 
disagree considerably on Nietzsche's conception of nature and the status of the human in 
relation to nonhuman animals in Nietzsche's texts. This bears quite significantly on whether 
Nietzsche has a view of human beings (and li.mher, the overhuman) as somehow transcending 
nature. Although I do not think Loeb would explicitly endorse rhe latter, it is implied in his 
argument. I do not find Niet7.sche distinguishing between the "mere animal" and the 
"human." A~ rhey are characterized in CM, humans are the animals who make promises-
they have not transcended rheir animality on accoum of their being able to make promises, 
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despite che common view to the contrary in the hisrory ofWesrern philosophy; the overhuman 
does not constitute a transcendence of rhis nature either. 
4." Thus, for translation of rhis section, rhe best we have is rhe one rendered by Maude-
marie Clark and Alan). Swensen (Hackert, 1998), but that will change with rhe new edirion 
of the Cambridge translation by Carol Oicthe, editc::d by Keith Ansell Pearson (On the Geneal-
ogy of Morality [Cambridge; Cambridge University ['ress, forthcoming 2006]). In their notes 
on rhe phrase in question, Clark and Swensen take notice of my first point about the absence 
of any language associated with rights and entidements, but they do not follow me in my 
second point about the context of making a comparison between powers and capabilities. 
5. Forgetting, it seems, is an important condition for experienct:-importanr for givin~ 
rhe shape, form, rhythm, rexrure, and depth that make the seemingly endless stream of possi-
ble objects of concern and attention an experience, ro recall Dewey's famous distinction, not 
simply by piling experienct:s up or onto one another, bur by taking some away, by encourag-
ing some to fade, recede, fall away. Forgetting in this sense grantl rather than evacuates or 
eliminates; roo much remembering leaves us with experience wirhour pause and mips from 
us possibilities for action. Nietzsche engages in more elaborate discussion of this idea in his 
earlier wrirings, particularly BT (in the association of the Dionysian with forgetting) and HL 
(where differentiation of the "stream of becoming" is described as necessary). 
6. The besr defense of the case for the sovereign individual is found in Keith Ansell Pear~ 
son's "Nietzsche on Autonomy and Morality; The dtallenge to Political Theory," Political 
Studie< 39 (1991), 276-301. 
7. Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy, 37. 
8. Harab notes that HH 618 refers ro "Individuum" in a similar vein. 
9. I provide further rexrual evidence drawn from Nierzsche in support of this claim as I 
interpret his analysis of the mnemonics of punishment in my "Forgening rhe Subject," in 
Reading Nietzsche at the Margim, edited by Steven Hicks and Alan Rosenberg (West l.afaycue, 
IN: Purdue University Press, forthcoming 2007). 
10. I discuss this idea at greater lengrh iu my "Nietzsche's Moral l,sychology,'' Blackwell 
Companion to Nietzsche, edited by Keith Ansell Pearson (Malden, MA: Blackwdl Publishers, 
Inc., 2006), 314-33. 
11 . Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy, 38. 
12. Interestingly, Kaufmann and Hollingdale inappropriarely insert the notion of rights in 
their translation of the passage with which the second essay concludes. They render the last 
sentence as follows: "At this point it bdmovt:s me only to be silent; or I shall usurp that to 
which only one younger, 'heavier with future,' and stronger than 1 has a righr-rhar to which 
only Zarathustra has a right, Zara.thustra the godlm.-" Bur there is nothing in rhe German 
original that implies that Nietzsche is talking abom rights. lnsread, he is dearly indicating a 
kind of foedom, nor entitlement, when he writ¢>, "-was allein Zarathusrra freisrdu, Zara~ 
thustra dem Gordosen" (KSA 5, p. 337). 
13. David Owen, "Equality, Democracy, and Self-Respect: Reflections on Nietzsche's 
Agonal Perfecdonism," in The journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (Fall 2002): 113-31. 
14. Richard White in his Nietzsche and the Probkm of Sovereignty (Citicago: Univer.~ity of 
Illinois Press, 1997). 
15. Subsequent co the original publication of this article are Loeb's article nored above; 
and Thomas Miles, "On Nierzsche's Ideal of the Sovereign Individual" (unpublished paper 
presemed co the North American Nietzsche Society, 28 April 2005). 
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16. Randall Havas makes this poim. Sec his Niazsc!NS Genealogy: Nihilism and the Will to 
Km1wkdge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University llress, 1995), esp. 193f£ I bri~fly discuss the views 
of Havas and Aaron Ridley in a note below. 
17. On this idea, see Sreven D. Hales and Rex Welshon, Nietzsche's Perspectivism (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2000), 
18. Numerous commentators have developed these ideas at greater length, particularly 
along the lines ofNietzsche's conception of language and grammar and his relation to Boscov~ 
ich and Spir. For a concise review on the relevant issues, see Wolfgang Miiller-Lauter, "On 
Judging in a World of Bt:coming: A Reflection on the 'Great Change' in Nieusche's Philoso-
phy," in Nietzsche, Theories of Knowkd~, and Critical Theory, edited by BciDette E. Babich 
and RobertS. Cohen (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 168-71. Compare Nietz-
sche's own discussion in "On the Prejudices of Philosophers" in BGE. See further Greg Whir-
lock's "Roger J. Boscovich and Friedrich Nietzsche: A Re-Examination" in Nietzsche, 
E:.'pisternology, and Philosophy of !:i'ciroce, edited by Babette E. Babich and Robert S. Cohen 
(Iloscon: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999); Robin SmaJI, "Boscovich Contra Nierzsche," 
in Philosophy and Phenomenological &search 1984 (46): 419-35; Robin Small, Nietzsche in 
Context (Aidershot, England: Ashgate, 2002); Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, BioWgy, and Meta-
phor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Michael Steven Green's Nietzsche 
and the Transcendental Tradition (Chicago: Universiry of Illinois Press, 2002). 
19. This is nor ar all to suggest that Nietzsche claims we should aim to return to our 
prehuman history-ir should be quite obvious that such is not possible in the same way that 
it is nor possible for anyone to selectively rerurn to some prior stage of human evolutionary 
development. The hisrory of Western philosophy exhibits a severe allergy to forgetting and 
an association with knowledbre, or enlightenment, srricrly with remembrance. I 6nd the same 
in Loeb's Conception of rhe "second forgerring" associated with Zarathustra's "enlighten-
ment," which curiously involves a forgetting (in the sense of foregoing) furgening (iu the 
sense of nut n:membering); sec pp. 166, 170-71. 
20. Owen, "Equ.Uity, Democr.tcy, and Self-Respect," 116. 
21. Owen is one of rhe few who at least recognize char the sovereign individual is not 
Nietzsche's idt:al in rhe sense of a future possibility (although Owen appears to think it is a 
worthy ideal tOr rhe present). Owen rightly points out thar Nietzsche associates the sovereign 
individual wirh rhe "morality of custom," a stage, in Niet-lSChe's hisrorical account of the 
development of morality that he considers "premoral" (with Kant, Sittlichkeit precedes Moral-
it/it). However, I consider rhe sovereign individual robe the ideal that serves as the inaugural 
transition between d1e prt:moral and moral stagt:s. Since the GeneaWgy appears to be orit:nted 
toward envisioning a "posrmoral" stage of development, it is curious rhat Owen would 
endeavor ro sketch Nietzsche's view about that stage by drawing on the type produced by the 
process of prcmoral customs. 
22. Owen, "Equality, Democracy, and Self-Respect," 118. Compare with David Owen 
and Aaron Ridley, "On Fate," International Studies in Philosophy 35:3 (2003): 63-78. 
23. Instead, Owen seems to emphasize ".self-responsibility" and upholding one's commit-
ments. For some concise accoums of the sovereign individual that do keep promise-making 
from and center, see Randall Havas, "Nietzsche's Idealism" and Aaron Ridley, "Ancillary 
1110ughts on an Ancillary 'JCxr," both in The journal of Nietzsche Studies 20 (2000): 90-99 
and 100-8, respectively. For Havas, the sovereign individual is the paradigmatic willing 
subjecr. he offers us ~nsrruction on what it means to will someching: "giving our word" is 
On Sovereignty and Overhumanity 161 
how this happens, and it is in rhis that we realize our "shared humanity" with others. Ridlt:y 
apparently arrributes to Nit:rzsche the idea that raking responsibility is a ach.it:vemen~ or an 
accomplishment for which we might aim. l have endeavored to argue rhar Nietzsche 1s chal-
lenging the idea that sovereign individuality and aU that it entai~s is the pinna~le of hum~n 
progress. I am not suggesting that Nietzsche does nor see a~yrhmg ar all that IS valuable. m 
the process of momlization and the working of the bad conscience that produces the soveretgn 
individual as an ideal rype. Indeed, I rhink a very interesting and persuasive case could ~e 
made that Nietzsche considers the pracdce of willing rhat rhe (vain) pursuit of sovt:reign indi-
viduality allows us to t:xercise has significant advantages, much as the slave revoir in morality 
(discussed in GM I) makes human heings inrercsting and creative in ways they had not been 
previously, and much as the ascetic ideal is shown to have been a highly effective .(yet. als.o 
destructive) mechanism fol" producing value (in GM III). But the ideal of tht: s~vert:1gn tnd~­
viduallike slave moraliry (and, perhaps, the ascetic ideal) is something chat N1etzsche envi-
sions overcoming. . . , . . . 
24. It is precisely this reading rhar leads many to cla1m chat Nietzsche s pohncs are decid-
edly aristocratic and antidemocratic. Owen and Havas endeavor to associate Niensc~e's vie~s 
with perfectionism and liberalisnl, thereby making Nietzsche's philosophy companble wnh 
democratic theory. Bur if we grant that Niensche is not embr.tcing rhe sovereign individual, 
but rather is calling for its overcoming, the need to discuss how sovereign individuality can 
be rendered l."'Omparible with democratic political theory disappears. Lawrence Hatab accom-
plishes the same without recourse to the sovereign individual. 
25. As an example, see Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (New York: Routledge, 1983), 294. 
26. This is not ro say that we are all already sovt:reign individuals bul rather that the con-
cept of humanity that we presently hold is one that takes sovereign individuality as a real and 
desimble possibility for us to endeavor to achieve. 
27. I mainrain that whatever is involved in overhumanity, and I have nor endeavored to 
describe it here, the beings who auain it or are involved in the process of pursuing ir remain 
nonerhdess animals. NierLSChe thinks the human is animal through and through. Of course, 
rhe human animal has its distinctive features, jusr as orher animals do, but tht:re's no reason 
ro think rhat these particular foatum somehow make rhe human animal more than merely an 
animal, they merely makt: tht: human an animal of a panicular sort. The focus upon some 
possible flight from or tr.tnscendence of animaliry is p~ec~sely what ~it:r:.sd1·e·aims to over-
comt: in his philosophical anrhropology, and it plays a stgmficant role m Ius cnuque of moral-
ity (e.g., GM 11:7). Further discussion of this can be found in the num7rous essays. include~ 
in A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docik and Brutal, cdned by Chnsta Dav1s 
~pora and Ralph R. Acampora (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2004). 
28. Richard White, Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty, 86. 
29. Whire reads Nietzsche as <tffirming the sovereign individual, but his discussion of the 
relevant passage is rather limitt:d (see his Niewche and the Problem ofSovereignty, 144ff). Still, 
his account of sovereignty and Niensche's concepcion of the individual is richer than those 
rhat bt'gin from the sovereign individual as NierL.Sche's paradigm. Sovereignty is a decidedly 
problematic issue for Nietzsche, on White's account; it is not a specific ideal rhar we ought 
to pursue. 
